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INTRODUCTION
In typical civil lawsuits, plaintiffs’ first step toward recovery is de-
termining who is responsible for their harm.  Although identifying a
defendant may seem like a trivial task, in a cause of action brought
under the federal securities laws, determining who is responsible for a
plaintiff’s harm is not always easy.1  A corporation acts through a num-
† B.A., Baruch College–The City University of New York, 2009; Candidate for J.D.,
Cornell Law School, 2014; Senior Articles Editor, Cornell Law Review, Volume 99.  I would
like to thank Professors Kevin Clermont and Charles Whitehead for their insight and help-
ful comments.  I am also extremely grateful for the hard work and dedication of the associ-
ates and editors of the Cornell Law Review, especially Notes Editors Steven Ma and Stefanie
Williams, as well as Managing Editors Conor McCormick, Catherine Eisenhut, and T.J.
Vita.  Finally, I would like to thank Jade Harry and the rest of my friends and family, whose
unwavering love and support has made it all possible.
1 See, e.g., Enzo Incandela, Note, Recourse Under § 10(b) on Life Support: The Displace-
ment of Liability and Private Securities Fraud Action After Janus v. First Derivative, 43 LOY. U.
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ber of different agents, including its directors and executives.
Through their corporation, those agents release a number of un-
signed, yet publicly available documents, such as press releases and
SEC-required disclosures.  When those documents contain material
misstatements or omissions, plaintiffs must determine which agents
are responsible for creating those documents in order to recover.2
In addition to difficulties associated with identifying a responsible
agent, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have instituted heightened pleading
standards in cases of corporate fraud.3  One can see the problem that
arises when plaintiffs are unsure of which corporate agent is ultimately
responsible for their harm but nevertheless must plead each element
of fraud with particularity.
Recognizing this burden, courts crafted the group pleading doc-
trine.  The group pleading doctrine creates a presumption “that cer-
tain group-published documents [such as SEC filings and press
releases] . . . are attributable to corporate insiders involved in the eve-
ryday affairs of the company.”4  The presumption allows a plaintiff to
“circumvent the general pleading rule that fraudulent statements
must be linked directly to the party accused of the fraudulent intent.”5
For example, where a corporation issues an unsigned press release
containing a false or misleading statement of material fact, a court
employing the group pleading doctrine would presume that certain
directors and officers collectively took part in creating the press
release.6
CHI. L.J. 935, 975 (2012) (noting the difficulty of determining nonspeaking defendants
who have no duty to disclose).
2 See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157
(2008).
3 See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat.
737 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1, 77z-2, 78j-1, 78u-4, 78u-5 (2012)); FED. R.
CIV. P. 9(b).  Both the PSLRA and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require plaintiffs to
plead each element of fraud with particularity.
4 In re UBS AG Sec. Litig., No. 07 Civ. 11225(RJS), 2012 WL 4471265, at *9 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 28, 2012) (quoting In re Take-Two Interactive Sec. Litig., 551 F. Supp. 2d 247, 266
(S.D.N.Y. 2008)).
5 Id. (quoting In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. 2008 Sec. Litig., 741 F. Supp. 2d 511, 529–30
(S.D.N.Y. 2010)); see also Wool v. Tandem Computers Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1441–42 (9th
Cir. 1987) (noting that it is permissible to presume that corporate officers involved in the
day-to-day activity of a corporation have the power to control transactions giving rise to
securities violations).  Many circuit courts have applied the presumption differently.  For
example, the Ninth Circuit has found that the presumption may not necessarily extend to
outside directors. See In re Stac Elecs. Sec. Litig., 89 F.3d 1399, 1410–11 (9th Cir. 1996).
6 This assumes the press release is unsigned.  Where attribution is clear, the particu-
lar defendants are liable for material misstatements and group pleading does not apply.
See Howard v. Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1061–62 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing the
importance of holding signers of SEC documents responsible for the statements they sign).
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By any account, the breadth of the group pleading doctrine has
been congressionally and judicially limited over the last two decades.7
When Congress passed the PSLRA, which specifically enacted height-
ened pleading standards for securities fraud, many courts insisted that
Congress intended to abrogate the group pleading doctrine.8  Those
courts reasoned that the heightened pleading standards were passed
to deter unmeritorious litigation, and the use of group pleading sub-
verted those goals.9  At the same time, a line of Supreme Court cases
narrowly defined the implied right of action under Rule 10b-5,10
promulgated under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (1934 Act).11  Nevertheless, despite the congressional and judi-
cial decisions, some courts persisted in allowing plaintiffs to rely on
the group pleading doctrine.12
In June 2011, the Supreme Court decided Janus Capital Group,
Inc. v. First Derivative Traders.13  The Court held that “[f]or purposes of
Rule 10b-5, the maker of a statement is the person or entity with ulti-
mate authority over the statement, including its content and whether and
how to communicate it.”14  In doing so, the Court effectively absolved
parties from primary liability under section 10(b) for statements they
may have been responsible for if they were not the ones who ulti-
mately made the statement.15
In a general sense, Janus was troubling because it further reduced
access to federal courts for violations of federal securities laws.16  In
particular, though, some courts interpreted Janus as abrogating the
group pleading doctrine, which could undermine plaintiffs’ ability to
bring claims against corporate insiders.17  Even though the Court did
not specifically mention the group pleading doctrine, many argue
that the presumption of attribution to corporate insiders may no
7 See, e.g., Incandela, supra note 1, at 945-49 (highlighting changes after the PSLRA’s R
passage and the Supreme Court’s response that further weakened private rights of action).
8 See infra note 40. R
9 See In re New Century, 588 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1224 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
10 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013).
11 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).  In 1994, the Court held that Rule 10b-5’s private right
of action does not apply to aiders and abettors who may contribute to making a misstate-
ment but who do not ultimately make the statement.  Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 180 (1994).  The Court went further in
Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 165 (2008), which
held that courts will give “narrow dimensions . . . to a right . . . Congress did not authorize
when it first enacted the statute and did not expand when it revisited the law.”
12 See infra note 40. R
13 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011).
14 Id. at 2302 (emphasis added).
15 Id. at 2303 (noting that construing Rule 10b-5(b) to mean “to create” “fails to cap-
ture its meaning when directed at an object expressing the action of a verb”).
16 See Incandela, supra note 1, at 949. R
17 See Howard Schiffman, The Relationship Between the Investment Adviser and the Mutual
Fund: Too Close for Comfort, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 183, 183 (1976).
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longer be viable because, “[w]ithout control, a person or entity can
merely suggest what to say, not ‘make’ a statement in its own right.
One who prepares or publishes a statement on behalf of another is
not its maker.”18  However, interpreting the majority’s decision in Ja-
nus as abrogating the group pleading doctrine is incorrect.  Such an
interpretation is contrary to the purpose of the federal securities laws,
as well as the PSLRA, and would ultimately make bad public policy.
As Justice Stephen Breyer points out in his dissent, this can cause gaps
in liability when a company’s board of directors has guilty intent but
the same company’s executives carry out the actions.19  Even assuming
that Congress and the Supreme Court intended to give Rule 10b-5
claims narrow construction, the application of the group pleading
doctrine to corporate insiders involved in the day-to-day activities of a
corporation is not contradictory to that intent.
Part I of this Note explores the history of the group pleading doc-
trine, including its application before and after Congress enacted the
PSLRA, as well as the different approaches the circuit courts have
taken in determining whether it survives.  Part II recounts the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Janus and explores the modest body of case
law that has since arisen.  Part III argues that there is a place for the
group pleading doctrine post-Janus.  There is no doubt that the group
pleading doctrine’s application is narrower than it was prior to the
passage of the PSLRA.20  After Janus, though, the group pleading doc-
trine can still play an important role in holding corporate insiders
liable.  Such a rule is consistent with Janus, the PSLRA, and public
policy.
I
THE HISTORY OF GROUP PLEADING
The group pleading doctrine has encountered judicial and con-
gressional hurdles since its inception.  The following subparts explore
those hurdles and examine the development of the doctrine in the
federal courts.
A. Before the PSLRA
The group pleading doctrine was created by the judiciary, initially
arising in the Ninth and Second Circuits.21  Even though each circuit
18 Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302.
19 See infra note 102 and accompanying text. R
20 See William O. Fisher, Don’t Call Me a Securities Law Groupie: The Rise and Possible
Demise of the “Group Pleading” Protocol in 10b-5 Cases, 56 BUS. LAW. 991, 1046 (2001).
21 See Schwartz v. Celestial Seasonings, Inc., 124 F.3d 1246, 1254 (10th Cir. 1997);
Wool v. Tandem Computers Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1440 (9th Cir. 1987).  For a brief sum-
mary of the three principal cases that gave rise to the group pleading doctrine in the
Second Circuit, see Fisher, supra note 20, at 1010–14. R
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has applied a slightly different version of the doctrine, the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s enunciation is the best example of the general rule:
In cases of corporate fraud where the false or misleading informa-
tion is conveyed in prospectuses, registration statements, annual re-
ports, press releases, or other “group-published information,” it is
reasonable to presume that these are the collective actions of the
officers.  Under such circumstances, a plaintiff fulfills the particular-
ity requirement of Rule 9(b) by pleading the misrepresentations
with particularity and where possible the roles of the individual de-
fendants in the misrepresentations.22
Both the Second and Ninth Circuits extended the application of
the group pleading doctrine to representatives other than corporate
officers.  The Ninth Circuit, for example, applied the doctrine to all
inside directors,23 as well as outside directors that participated in
day-to-day corporate activities or had a special relationship with the
corporation.24  However, relying on the “day-to-day involvement” stan-
dard, the court refused to extend the group pleading doctrine to in-
clude outside advisers, underwriters, or large shareholders.25
Other circuits also recognized the application of the group plead-
ing doctrine.  In Schwartz v. Celestial Seasonings, Inc., the Tenth Circuit
held that “[i]dentifying the individual sources of statements is unnec-
essary when the fraud allegations arise from misstatements or omis-
sions in group-published documents such as annual reports, which
presumably involve collective actions of corporate directors or of-
ficers.”26  Other courts, although never directly addressing the issue,
implicitly applied the group pleading doctrine.27  Despite differences
in the exact breadth of the group pleading doctrine, such as to which
22 Wool, 818 F.2d at 1440 (citations omitted).
23 See Blake v. Dierdorff, 856 F.2d 1365, 1369 (9th Cir. 1988) (“[P]resumption of col-
lective action when there is misleading ‘group published information’ is equally applicable
to members of a board of directors . . . .”).
24 See In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 60 F.3d 591, 593 (9th Cir. 1995).
25 See Moore v. Kayport Package Express, Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 539–41 (9th Cir. 1989)
(outside advisors); Fisher, supra note 20, at 1000 n.35 (underwriters); id. at 1001 n.36 R
(large shareholders and venture capitalists).  Rather than looking at a defendant’s day-to-
day activity to determine liability, the Second Circuit relied on a defendant’s status as an
“insider.” See, e.g., Friedman v. Treasure Island N.V., No. 90 Civ. 2882 (PKL), 1992 WL
111371, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 1992) (stating that plaintiffs did not need to show a connec-
tion between defendants and alleged misstatements because almost all defendants were
insiders or affiliates); Pellman v. Cinerama, Inc., 503 F. Supp. 107, 108, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(noting that all defendants were insiders).
26 124 F.3d 1246, 1254 (10th Cir. 1997).  Although the decision date of this case is
after the passage of the PSLRA, the case was brought prior to enactment.  The Tenth
Circuit has not decided the viability of the group pleading doctrine post-PSLRA.
27 See, e.g., Ballan v. Upjohn Co., 814 F. Supp. 1375, 1387 (W.D. Mich. 1992) (holding
that defendants were properly named in the securities fraud claim because they all signed
internal company documents, reports, and other information and attended management
and board meetings).
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corporate figures or documents it applied,28 the general rule re-
mained the same: where a representative was directly involved in the
management of a corporation, that representative’s involvement in
the creation of a corporate document was presumed.29
The Supreme Court’s decision in Central Bank v. First Interstate
Bank30 was the first in a line of cases to raise doubts about the viability
of the group pleading doctrine.31  In Central Bank, the Court held that
there could be no aiding and abetting liability in Rule 10b-5 actions.32
The Court’s holding raised doubts about group pleading because it
clouded the divide between corporate insiders who made material
misstatements, as required under Rule 10b-5, and corporate insiders
who merely aided in the creation of material misstatements.  The
holding in Central Bank and its impact on the group pleading doctrine
has been thoroughly analyzed,33 and subsequent judicial decisions
failed to come to a consensus with respect to Central Bank’s impact on
group pleading.  Some courts firmly held that group pleading sur-
vived Central Bank.34
Other courts emphasized the important distinction between pri-
mary and secondary liability.35  Prior to Central Bank, plaintiffs could
28 The district courts are all over the map on this point. Wool itself specifically refer-
enced “prospectuses, registration statements, annual reports, [and] press releases.”  Wool
v. Tandem Computers Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1440 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Cosmas v. Hassett,
886 F.2d 8, 11–13 (2d Cir. 1989) (extending Second Circuit’s group pleading rule to cover
press releases and SEC filings, as well).  Courts went on to find other corporate documents
to qualify as group published. See, e.g., Polar Int’l Brokerage Corp. v. Reeve, 108 F. Supp.
2d 225, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (tender offer documents); Walsh v. Emerson, No. 88-952-DA,
1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18289, at *9 (D. Or. Oct. 3, 1989) (offer sheets given to retiring
employees).
29 See, e.g., Wool, 818 F.2d at 1440 (discussing instances where it is reasonable to pre-
sume actions are the collective actions of a company’s officers).
30 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
31 Id. at 191–92.
32 Id. at 180.
33 See Fisher, supra note 20, at 1030–47 (“Because Central Bank seems to contract the R
circle of possible securities law defendants and because ‘group pleading’ permits plaintiffs
to place defendants within the circle at least for purposes of a complaint, it is important to
consider whether Central Bank affects the ‘group pleading’ authorities.”); see also S. Scott
Luton, The Ebb and Flow of Section 10(b) Jurisprudence: An Analysis of Central Bank, 17 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L.J. 45, 46 (1994) (noting the congressional response to Central Bank leading
to the passage of the PSLRA).
34 See, e.g., In re Sunbeam Sec. Litig., 89 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1342 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (“In
no way does [Central Bank] restrict the ability of a plaintiff to allege primary violations of
Section 10(b) against groups of defendants.”); In re Health Mgmt., Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F.
Supp. 192, 207–10 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that group pleading is alive and well post-
Central Bank); McDaid v. Sanders, No. C-95-20750-JW, 1996 WL 241605, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
May 3, 1996) (“The Court does not read Central Bank as abolishing group pleading.
Rather, Central Bank prohibits a private right of action for ‘aiding and abetting’ liability, a
theory not alleged in this case.”).
35 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Cantor, 123 F.3d 717, 720–21 & n.2 (2d Cir. 1997) (“In pre-
Central Bank cases, some courts did not distinguish precisely between primary liability and
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include any and all corporate agents in their complaint on the theory
that “[i]f the defendant was not a primary violator, he or she might
well be an aider and abettor or a co-conspirator.”36  Because Central
Bank did not allow for secondary liability under Rule 10b-5 actions,
representatives that were not primarily liable could no longer be held
secondarily liable and thus were not proper defendants.37
Needless to say, the wide range of decisions following Central
Bank represented the lower courts’ confusion.  Indeed, the Court it-
self appeared to invite legislative action to rectify its holding: “To be
sure, aiding and abetting a wrongdoer ought to be actionable in cer-
tain instances.  The issue, however, is not whether imposing private
civil liability on aiders and abettors is good policy but whether aiding
and abetting is covered by the statute.”38  Congress took the Court’s
advice and enacted the PSLRA less than a year after the Central Bank
decision.39
B. After the PSLRA
In the midst of Newt Gingrich’s Contract with America, the Pri-
vate Securities Litigation and Reform Act of 1995 was passed over
Presidential veto.40  What started out as a bipartisan comprehensive
overhaul of liability for securities class actions41 evolved into legisla-
tion that, among other things, raised the pleading standard for plain-
tiffs to bring securities class actions in federal court.42  Specifically, the
PSLRA required plaintiffs’ complaints to “specify each statement al-
leged to have been misleading . . . and, if an allegation regarding the
statement or omission is made on information and belief, the com-
plaint shall state with particularity all facts on which that belief is
formed.”43
aiding and abetting liability.”); see also Fisher, supra note 20, at 1030–32 (describing the R
importance of the definition of primary liability after Central Bank).
36 Fisher, supra note 20, at 1032. R
37 Id.
38 Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164,
177 (1994) (citations omitted).
39 See John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: The Long and Winding Road to the Pri-
vate Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 BUS. LAW. 335, 335–36 (1996).
40 For a history of the passage of the PSLRA, see generally id. at 335–53.
41 See Luton, supra note 33, at 83–86.  Senators Chris Dodd (Democrat) and Pete V. R
Domenici (Republican) introduced the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in 1994,
prior to the decision in Central Bank. Id.  However, “the Senate Subcommittee on Securi-
ties, a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
held a hearing concerning the Central Bank decision.” Id. at 84.
42 See Avery, supra note 39, at 357–59 (describing the heightened pleading standards R
required by the PSLRA); Incandela, supra note 1, at 935. R
43 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)(B) (2012) (emphasis added).  The heightened pleading
requirement is one of the three specific reasons that President Clinton pointed to when
vetoing the legislation: “I am returning herewith without my approval H.R. 1058, the ‘Pri-
vate Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 . . . .  I am not . . . willing to sign legislation
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While Congress debated the PSLRA, commentators were already
predicting the end of the group pleading doctrine because of the par-
ticularity pleading requirement.44  The judicial response reflected
those commentators’ predictions.  Courts that refused to reject the
group pleading doctrine in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Central Bank45 showed no such reluctance after the passage of the
PSLRA.
The Fifth Circuit was the first circuit to explicitly to reject the
group pleading doctrine after the PSLRA.46  The Third and the Sev-
enth Circuits followed, relying predominantly on the Fifth Circuit’s
reasoning.47  The Fifth Circuit found it irrelevant that Congress did
not explicitly overrule the group pleading doctrine “because Congress
never made this judicial creation law to begin with.”48  The court con-
tinued, adding that group pleading doctrine “cannot withstand the
PSLRA’s specific requirement that the untrue statements or omissions
be set forth with particularity as to ‘the defendant.’”49  Because the
PSLRA specifically references “the defendant,” the court concluded
that Congress could only have meant for particularity to be required
for each and every defendant in a multiple-defendant action.50  The
Fifth Circuit’s holding created a very high burden, requiring “specific
factual allegations” linking a corporate insider to misstatements in
“corporate documents that have no stated author or statements within
documents not attributed to any individual.”51
Two years later in Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., the
Seventh Circuit relied on the Fifth Circuit’s decision to abrogate the
group pleading doctrine.52  Finding the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning per-
that will have the effect of closing the courthouse door on investors who have legitimate
claims.  Those who are the victims of fraud should have recourse in our courts.  Unfortu-
nately, changes made in this bill during conference could well prevent that.”  William J.
Clinton, Veto Message for Securities Litigation Reform Act (Dec. 20, 1995), 1995 WL
752715, at *1.
44 Luton, supra note 33, at 92 (“The Act would impose much stricter pleading stan- R
dards and would directly overrule Rule 9(b) and the ‘group pleading doctrine.’”).
45 See Fisher, supra note 20, at 1031–32. R
46 See Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 365 (5th Cir.
2004) (“[T]he PSLRA requires the plaintiffs to ‘distinguish among those they sue and en-
lighten each defendant as to his or her particular part in the alleged fraud.’  As such, corpo-
rate officers may not be held responsible for unattributed corporate statements solely on
the basis of their titles, even if their general level of day-to-day involvement in the corpora-
tion’s affairs is pleaded.”).
47 See Winer Family Trust v. Queen, 503 F.3d 319, 336–37 (3d Cir. 2007); Makor Issues
& Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 603 (7th Cir. 2006), rev’d on other grounds, 551
U.S. 308 (2007).
48 Southland, 365 F.3d at 364.
49 Id.
50 See id. at 364–65.
51 See id. at 365.
52 437 F.3d 588 (7th Cir. 2006), rev’d on other grounds, 551 U.S. 308 (2007).
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suasive, the court in Tellabs contended that plaintiffs would have to
prove each element of securities fraud “with respect to each individual
defendant in multiple defendant cases.”53  One year later, citing the
Fifth and the Seventh Circuits, the Third Circuit also rejected the ap-
plication of the group pleading doctrine.54  And although the Elev-
enth Circuit has never explicitly rejected the group pleading doctrine,
dicta suggests that it would adopt the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning.55
Still, a few circuits either implicitly recognized the continued exis-
tence of the group pleading doctrine or explicitly refused to reject its
application.  The Sixth Circuit, for example, conceded that it had
never officially recognized the group pleading doctrine but neverthe-
less refused to foreclose the possibility of it surviving the PSLRA.56
Meanwhile, the Second Circuit refused to abrogate the group plead-
ing doctrine, once assuming its continued existence57 and once vacat-
ing the lower court’s dismissal for failure to consider its application.58
Other courts had the opportunity to address the viability of the
group pleading doctrine after the PSLRA but equivocated on the is-
sue.  The First Circuit spoke at great length about the advantages and
disadvantages of the group pleading doctrine, but it ultimately de-
cided the case on other grounds.59  Similarly, the Eight Circuit had an
opportunity to address the viability of the group pleading doctrine,
53 See id. at 603.
54 See Winer Family Trust v. Queen, 503 F.3d 319, 337 (3d Cir. 2007) (“We agree [with
the Fifth Circuit] and hold the group pleading doctrine is no longer viable in private secur-
ities actions after the enactment of the PSLRA.”).
55 See Phillips v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 374 F.3d 1015, 1018 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he
most plausible reading in light of congressional intent is that a plaintiff, to proceed beyond
the pleading stage, must allege facts sufficiently demonstrating each defendant’s state of
mind regarding his or her alleged violations.”).
56 See City of Monroe Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651, 690 (6th Cir.
2005) (“We need not decide here the current viability of the group-published doctrine
because resolution of that question is not required to decide this case.”).  The Sixth Circuit
also recognized that even its own districts disagreed upon the applicability of the group
pleading doctrine, with some of them continuing to apply it. Id.
57 See Yung v. Lee, 160 F. App’x 37, 42 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Assuming arguendo that the
group pleading doctrine survives the strict pleading requirements [of the PSLRA] . . . .”).
58 See Ill. State Bd. of Inv. v. Authentidate Holding Corp., 369 F. App’x 260, 266 (2d
Cir. 2010) (“Because the district court did not address the individual defendants’ liability
under . . . the group pleading doctrine, we vacate and remand . . . .”).
59 See Miss. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Bos. Scientific Corp., 523 F.3d 75, 93 (1st Cir.
2008) (declining to decide in the first instance whether the group pleading doctrine sur-
vived the PSLRA and holding that the “questions should be resolved in the first instance by
the district court”); In re Cabletron Sys., Inc., 311 F.3d 11, 40 (1st Cir. 2002) (“For purposes
of this opinion, we will set the issue aside without deciding it, because we determine with-
out reference to the group pleading presumption whether the complaint states a claim
against each defendant.”).
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but also chose to decide the case on other grounds.60  Meanwhile, the
Tenth Circuit has yet to address the issue.61
The indecision and conflicting rulings by the several circuits led
to inconsistent results below.  Many lower courts continued to allow
plaintiffs to circumvent the strict requirements of the PSLRA via the
group pleading doctrine.62  Conversely, there were a number of lower
courts within undecided circuits that rejected the application of the
group pleading doctrine.63  Needless to say, courts had trouble inter-
preting the pleading standards of the PSLRA64 and determining
whether those standards signaled the demise of the group pleading
doctrine.
One of the Supreme Court’s last words on the scope of Rule
10b-5 claims was in Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-At-
lanta, Inc.65  There, the Court made it clear that lower courts should
give “narrow dimensions . . . to a right . . . Congress did not authorize
when it first enacted the [1934 Act] and did not expand when it revis-
ited the law.”66  Taken literally, courts may have found it even more
difficult to argue that the group pleading doctrine was viable.  Never-
60 In re Hutchinson Tech., Inc. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 952, 961 n.6 (8th Cir. 2008)
(“[B]ecause we have held that NECA’s complaint is insufficient under the PSLRA we need
not consider the issue of whether this doctrine survived the PSLRA or whether the doc-
trine applies here.”).
61 In Schwartz v. Celestial Seasonings, Inc., 124 F.3d 1246, 1254 (10th Cir. 1997), the
court held that “[i]dentifying the individual sources of statements is unnecessary when the
fraud allegations arise from misstatements or omissions in group-published documents
such as annual reports, which presumably involve collective actions of corporate directors
or officers.”  This lawsuit predated the PSLRA, however, and the Tenth Circuit has yet to
revisit the issue. See supra note 26. R
62 See, e.g., In re Raytheon Sec. Litig., 157 F. Supp. 2d 131, 152–53 (D. Mass. 2001); In
re SmarTalk Teleservices, Inc. Sec. Litig., 124 F. Supp. 2d 527, 545 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (hold-
ing PSLRA did not abolish group published information rule); accord In re Baan Co. Sec.
Litig., 103 F. Supp. 2d 1, 17 (D.D.C. 2000); In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc., Sec. Litig., 187
F.R.D. 133, 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); In re Sunbeam Sec. Litig., 89 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1340–41
(S.D. Fla. 1999); In re Livent, Inc. Sec. Litig., 78 F. Supp. 2d 194, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); In re
BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 78 F. Supp. 2d 976, 987 (E.D. Mo. 1999); In re Miller Indus.,
Inc. Sec. Litig., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1329 (N.D. Ga. 1998); In re Stratosphere Corp., 1 F.
Supp. 2d 1096, 1107–08 (D. Nev. 1998); In re Digi Int’l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 6 F. Supp. 2d 1089,
1101 (D. Minn. 1998), aff’d, 14 F. App’x 714 (8th Cir. 2001); Powers v. Eichen, 977 F. Supp.
1031, 1040 (S.D. Cal. 1997); In re Health Mgmt., Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 192, 208–09
(E.D.N.Y. 1997).
63 See, e.g., P. Schoenfeld Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Cendant Corp., 142 F. Supp. 2d 589,
620–21 (D.N.J. 2001); In re Miller Indus., Inc. Sec. Litig., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 1329–30; Allison
v. Brooktree Corp., 999 F. Supp. 1342, 1350 (S.D. Cal. 1998).
64 See In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999) (“There
is widespread disagreement among courts as to the proper interpretation of the PSLRA’s
heightened pleading requirement.”).  The Supreme Court clarified the scienter require-
ments of the PSLRA in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 323 (2007)
(“[I]n determining whether the pleaded facts give rise to a ‘strong’ inference of scienter,
the court must take into account plausible opposing inferences.”).
65 See 552 U.S. 148, 165 (2008).
66 Id. at 167.
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theless, some courts continued to allow plaintiffs to rely on the group
pleading doctrine.67  And as one court pointed out, “Congress did not
expressly prohibit group pleading in the PSLRA.”68
II
THE FUTURE OF GROUP PLEADING
A. Janus v. First Derivative
The Supreme Court stepped in to settle the confusion about the
interpretation of Rule 10b-5.  Janus Capital Group (JCG) was a pub-
licly traded company that created the Janus Investment Fund (JIF), a
collection of mutual funds that were managed by JCG and JCG’s
wholly owned subsidiary, Janus Capital Management (JCM).69  Even
though the officers of JIF were all officers of JCG, the two entities were
sufficiently independent to qualify as separate legal entities.70  As re-
quired by law, JIF periodically released public disclosure documents,
including prospectuses.71  In particular, the prospectuses represented
that JIF, through JCM, would refrain from market timing.72  However,
allegations arose that JCM and JCG used market timing,73 ultimately
leading to investors withdrawing significant funds from JIF mutual
funds.74  Because JIF was a major source of revenue for JCG, JCG’s
stock price plummeted.75
First Derivative Traders, representing the allegedly injured stock-
holders of JCG, brought a class action against JCG and JCM asserting
violations of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.76  Plaintiffs contended that
67 See, e.g., Pa. Ave. Funds v. Inyx Inc., 08 CIV. 6857 (PKC), 2010 WL 743562, at *17
n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2010) (“The majority of judges in this district who have addressed the
issue have concluded that the group pleading doctrine has survived the PSLRA.”); In re
Thornburg Mortg., Inc. Sec. Litig., 695 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1199 (D.N.M. 2010) (“The
Court . . . is not prepared to judicially declare that the PSLRA forbids all instances of group
pleading.”).
68 Thornburg Mortg., 695 F. Supp. 2d at 1199.
69 Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2299 (2011).
Mutual funds are typically managed by the same people who organize their creation. See
Schiffman, supra note 17, at 183. R
70 See Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2299–300.
71 See id. at 2300.
72 Id.  Market timing “involves investors buying or selling mutual fund shares (before
the 4 p.m. close of stock trading) at a net asset value that is nonetheless based on stale
prices.” See Stephen Choi & Marcel Kahan, The Market Penalty for Mutual Fund Scandals, 87
B.U. L. REV. 1021, 1028 (2007).  Although market timing is not illegal, it harms the mutual
fund because it generates transaction costs that those investors must bear.  See id. at 1023
n.18, 1028.
73 The source of the allegation was a complaint that the Attorney General of New
York filed against JCG and JCM that became public. See Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2299–300.
74 See id.
75 See id.
76 The SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5 in 1942 under the catchall antifraud provision,
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. See Eric C. Chaffee, Standing Under Sec-
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JCG and JCM were ultimately responsible for the misstatements in
JIF’s prospectuses and that plaintiffs detrimentally relied on those mis-
statements.77  The District Court of Maryland dismissed the suit for
failing to state a claim, but the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding “that
First Derivative had sufficiently alleged that ‘JCG and JCM, by partici-
pating in the writing and dissemination of the prospectuses, made the
misleading statements contained in the documents.’”78  The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to decide “whether JCM can be held liable in
a private action under Rule 10b-5 for false statements included in Ja-
nus Investment Fund’s prospectuses.”79
In a 5–4 decision, Justice Clarence Thomas, writing for the major-
ity, held that JCM could not be liable for false statements in JIF’s pro-
spectuses because JCM did not make the material misstatement for
purposes of Rule 10b-5 claims.80  Relying on the contemporary dic-
tionary definition of “to make,”81 Justice Thomas held that “[w]hen
‘make’ is paired with a noun expressing the action of a verb, the re-
sulting phrase is ‘approximately equivalent in sense’ to that verb.”82
Therefore, Justice Thomas reasoned, the phrase in Rule 10b-5(b),
“[t]o make any . . . statement,” was the equivalent of “to state.”83  With
this statutory interpretation in hand, Justice Thomas concluded that
“the maker of a statement is the person or entity with ultimate author-
ity over the statement, including its content and whether and how to
communicate it.”84  Justice Thomas relied on an analogy of the rela-
tionship between a speechwriter and a speaker, stating that only the
ultimate maker of the misstatement (the speaker) can be liable for
tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5: The Continued Validity of the Forced Seller Exception to the Purchaser-
Seller Requirement, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 843, 852 (2009).  To succeed on a claim brought
under Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must prove “(1) a material misrepresentation or omission by
the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission
and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omis-
sion; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.”  Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scien-
tific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157 (2008).
77 See Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2300–01.  Plaintiffs also contended that JCG and JCM should
be liable as controlling persons under section 20(a) of the Act.  Id.
78 Id. at 2301 (quoting In re Mutual Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d 111, 121 (2009)) (em-
phasis in original).  For a more detailed analysis of the lower court decisions, see In-
candela, supra note 1, at 966–70. R
79 Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2301.
80 See id. at 2305.
81 Justice Thomas is known to consult period dictionaries to determine the meaning
of words in their original context. See Gregory E. Maggs, Which Original Meaning of the
Constitution Matters to Justice Thomas?, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 494, 505 (2009).  In this case,
Justice Thomas consulted the Oxford English Dictionary published in 1933. See Janus, 131
S. Ct. at 2302.
82 See Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302.
83 Id.
84 Id.
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what another (the speechwriter) creates.85  Despite the managerial
and investment services JCM and JCG provided to JIF, and their sub-
stantial aid that went into creating the prospectuses, the Court refused
to extend liability because plaintiffs failed to allege that JCM was the
party with ultimate authority over the statements at issue.86
Justice Thomas grounded his interpretation in preceding case
law and policy.  He argued that the holding was a natural successor to
Central Bank and Stoneridge : that ultimate authority is required for
claims of primary liability to distinguish them from claims of secon-
dary liability under section 20(a) of the 1934 Act.87  Furthermore,
holding JCM liable for statements by JIF would inappropriately disre-
gard the corporate formalities observed by the two legal entities.88  Be-
cause JIF and JCM met the minimum statutory requirements to ensure
separateness, to hold one liable for the other’s actions would render
the laws allowing separateness meaningless.89  In particular, Justice
Thomas pointed to the statutory obligation to file a prospectus, a task
that was required of JIF, not JCM.90  Even if JCM assisted in preparing
JIF’s prospectus, Justice Thomas stated, such assistance “does not
mean that JCM ‘made’ any statements in the prospectuses.”91
Writing for a four-Justice dissent, Justice Stephen Breyer argued
that JCM could be responsible for having made the false misstate-
ments, even if JIF ultimately made the misstatements.92  Justice Breyer
raised several arguments against the majority’s conclusion.93  Most sig-
nificantly, Justice Breyer did not believe that the person who “makes”
a misstatement must have ultimate authority over the statement.94
There can be a deviation, according to Justice Breyer, between the
party who makes a misstatement and the party with ultimate authority
over it, such as when “cabinet officials make statements about matters
85 See id. (“Even when a speechwriter drafts a speech, the content is entirely within the
control of the person who delivers it.  And it is the speaker who takes credit—or blame—
for what is ultimately said.”).
86 See id.
87 See id. at 2302–03.
88 See id. at 2304.  In addition, it is typical practice for the investment advisors to be
elected to the board of directors of the fund. See Schiffman, supra note 17, at 183. R
89 See Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2304.
90 See id.  A mutual fund, as the issuer of securities, is required to deliver a prospectus
that complies with section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act prior to the sale of securities.
See Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act) § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012).
91 Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2305.
92 See id. at 2305–12 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
93 With respect to Justice Breyer’s argument against the majority, it is important to
note that Justice Breyer believed that the majority confused primary and secondary liability
under the 1934 Act when coming to its conclusion. See id. at 2306–09; see also Justin
Marocco, Comment, When Will It Finally End: The Effectiveness of the Rule 10b-5 Private Action
as a Fraud-Deterrence Mechanism Post-Janus, 73 LA. L. REV. 633, 647 (2013) (“Additionally, the
dissent asserted that the majority incorrectly relied on Central Bank and Stoneridge.”).
94 See Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2307.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-2\CRN205.txt unknown Seq: 14 10-JAN-14 12:01
470 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:457
that the Constitution places within the ultimate authority of the
President.”95
Further, Justice Breyer did not think that the English language
prevented several different individuals from collectively making a
statement, either separately or together, so long as they were all com-
plicit in producing such a statement.96  Rather than relying on simply
equating “ultimate authority” with “making a misstatement,” Justice
Breyer concluded that “[p]ractical matters related to context, includ-
ing control, participation, and relevant audience, help determine who
‘makes’ a statement and to whom that statement may properly be ‘at-
tributed,’ at least as far as ordinary English is concerned.”97
Justice Breyer went on to examine the interplay between section
10(b)—primary liability under which Rule 10b-5 is promulgated—and
20(a)—secondary liability.98  While Justice Thomas posited that the
Janus rule was necessary to avoid a broader application of primary lia-
bility than secondary liability, Justice Breyer countered that any rem-
edy under the securities law, section 20(a) included, would not
prevent a claim under section 10(b).99
Rather than being alarmed by the overlap of the two claims, Jus-
tice Breyer was concerned with the potential loophole created by the
majority’s interpretation of Rule 10b-5.  In particular, Justice Breyer
argued that “there is at least one significant category of cases that
§ 10(b) may address that derivative forms of liability, such as under
§ 20(a), cannot, namely, cases in which one actor exploits another as
an innocent intermediary for its misstatements.”100  If, for example,
JIF’s board of trustees knew nothing about the misstatements in the
prospectuses, then section 20(a) would not apply.  Nor would the
95 Id.  More relevant to the analysis, Justice Breyer states that “a management com-
pany, a board of trustees, individual company officers, or others, separately or together,
might ‘make’ statements contained in a firm’s prospectus—even if a board of directors has
ultimate content-related responsibility.” Id. at 2306.
96 See id. at 2307.
97 Id. (citations omitted).
98 See id. at 2310.
99 See id. at 2310.  Section 20(a) reads: “Every person who, directly or indirectly, con-
trols any person liable under any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation
thereunder shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such
controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable . . . .”  15
U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2012).  Justice Thomas was of the belief that any interpretation of the
words “to make” that includes those persons who do not have ultimate authority of the
statements would necessarily create double liability and, thus, a redundancy in the statu-
tory code. See Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2304 (majority opinion).  Justice Breyer, however, be-
lieved that it was better to have some overlap of the two remedies rather than to leave some
plaintiffs without a remedy under either sections 10(b) or 20(a). Id. at 2310 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
100 Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2310.
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board of trustees be liable under Rule 10b-5, since it was unaware of
the misstatements.101  Justice Breyer wrote:
The possibility of guilty management and innocent board is the
13th stroke of the new rule’s clock.  What is to happen when guilty
management writes a prospectus (for the board) containing materi-
ally false statements and fools both board and public into believing
they are true?  Apparently under the majority’s rule, in such circum-
stances no one could be found to have “ma[d]e” a materially false
statement . . . .102
If no one can be found to have made the misstatement, Justice Breyer
continued, then no one could be held principally liable for it, and
consequently, other parties would escape secondary liability.103
B. In the Aftermath of Janus
The most telling part of the majority opinion is its analogy to the
speechwriter and the speaker.104  Although the analogy is simple
enough to understand, one is left with more questions than answers
when applying it to traditional Rule 10b-5 claims.  Since the speaker is
the only person who may be held liable for any material misstatements
that the speech contains, how does a court decide who is liable for a
corporate document that does not indicate the identity of the
speaker?  Furthermore, how is a plaintiff supposed to find out which
corporate representative made the misstatement contained in the cor-
porate document if the plaintiff is not entitled to discovery until after
pleading with particularity the details of every element of the fraud?105
The Supreme Court never explicitly addressed the group plead-
ing doctrine in Janus.  By holding that liability could only be imposed
upon the actual speaker of a misstatement, though, many district
courts concluded that the group pleading doctrine was no longer via-
ble because only one person, the speaker, could be liable for material
misstatements.106  Still, other courts have merely questioned the
101 As previously discussed, one of elements of a Rule 10b-5 claim is scienter, a defen-
dant’s knowledge of the fraud. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.,
552 U.S. 148, 157 (2008); Chaffee, supra note 76, at 852. R
102 Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2310.
103 Id.  Prosecuting a party for aiding and abetting requires a primary violator. See id.
(citing SEC v. DiBella, 587 F.3d 553, 566 (2d Cir. 2009)).
104 Id. at 2302 (majority opinion).
105 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(b)(1), 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2012) (discussing stays on discovery
relating to motions to dismiss).
106 See, e.g., In re UBS AG Sec. Litig., No. 07 Civ. 11225(RJS), 2012 WL 4471265, at *10
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2012) (holding that the group pleading doctrine does not survive Ja-
nus); see also In re Am. Apparel, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. CV 10-06352 MMM (JCGX), 2013
WL 174119, at *26 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2013) (dismissing certain claims against a company’s
CEO and CFO but allowing plaintiff to amend “to state a viable claim against them outside
the group pleading doctrine”).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-2\CRN205.txt unknown Seq: 16 10-JAN-14 12:01
472 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:457
group pleading doctrine’s validity,107 while some courts continue to
apply the group pleading doctrine.108
III
THE GROUP PLEADING DOCTRINE AND CORPORATE INSIDERS
Without a doubt, Janus forecloses the application of the group
pleading doctrine to executives of one corporation for the misstate-
ments of a different corporation.  This Note does not attempt to argue
that Janus was wrongly decided; that argument has been made else-
where.109  This Part argues that there is still a place for the group
pleading doctrine to ensure that corporate insiders are held liable for
misstatements made by their corporation.  This application of the
group pleading doctrine is consistent with its original use, with the
Court’s holding in Janus, and with Congress’s intent under the
PSLRA.
In subpart A, I argue that it is not enough simply to cite to Janus
for the proposition that the group pleading doctrine has been re-
jected.  The group pleading doctrine is still viable in situations where
107 See, e.g., Orlan v. Spongetech Delivery Sys., Inc., Sec. Litig., Nos. 10-CV-4093
(DLI)(JMA), 10-CV-4104 (DLI)(JMA), 2012 WL 1067975, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2012)
(questioning without deciding the viability of the group pleading doctrine); In re Optimal
U.S. Litig., 837 F. Supp. 2d 244, 262–64 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting that the case does not
concern the group pleading doctrine for a federal securities law); Rolin v. Spartan Mullen
Et Cie, S.A., No. 10 Civ. 1586(CM)(FM), 2011 WL 5920931, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2011)
(discussing whether Janus abrogates the group pleading doctrine is an open question);
Haw. Ironworkers Annuity Trust Fund v. Cole, No. 3:10CV371, 2011 WL 3862206, at *3
(N.D. Ohio Sept. 1, 2011) (holding that the requirements of particularity in Janus apply to
corporate insiders);.
108 See, e.g., In re Satyam Computer Servs. Ltd. Sec. Litig., 915 F. Supp. 2d 450, 477
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (acknowledging and agreeing with plaintiffs’ choice to use the group
pleading doctrine); City of Pontiac Gen. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 875 F.
Supp. 2d 359, 373–74 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (agreeing that the group pleading doctrine is alive
and well); Warchol v. Green Mountain Coffee Roasters, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-227, 2012 WL
256099, at *1, *5 n.9 (D. Vt. Jan. 27, 2012) (noting that the group pleading doctrine is the
majority rule in the Southern District of New York); In re St. Jude Med., Inc. Sec. Litig., 836
F. Supp. 2d 878, 906 n.11 (D. Minn. 2011) (noting that the group pleading doctrine might
be sufficient to hold the defendants accountable); Murdeshwar v. Search Media Holdings
Ltd., No. 11-CIV-20549, 2011 WL 7704347, at *12 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2011) (noting that the
Pre-Merger Statements are attributable to defendants because of the group pleading doc-
trine); see also In re Coinstar Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C11-133 MJP, 2011 WL 4712206, at *10–11
(W.D. Wash. Oct. 6, 2011) (endorsing the survival of the group pleading doctrine implic-
itly by finding it inapplicable to the particular case at issue).
109 See, e.g., Zachary K. Ostro, Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders:
Further Limiting Limited Liability, and Missing an Opportunity to Curb Corporate Misconduct, 8 J.
BUS. & TECH. L. 275, 312 (2013) (“The Court’s holding in Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First
Derivative Traders was a three-part failure.”); James D. Redwood, To Make or to Mar: The
Supreme Court Turns Away Another Securities Law Plaintiff, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 463, 513 (2012)
(“The Court’s willful slighting of the actual meaning of the word ‘make,’ and its activist
substitution of an artificial test of ‘ultimate authority’ or ‘control’ for a reasonable defini-
tion of the word, without any precedent to back up its approach, were unfounded mea-
sures which the facts did not justify.”).
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corporate insiders are being held liable for misstatements by their cor-
porate employers. Janus is a different case factually, and the concerns
expressed by Justice Thomas in Janus do not apply when the group
pleading doctrine is applied to corporate insiders.110  Indeed, all that
is required is a finding that the corporate insider has “ultimate author-
ity” over the misstatement.  Therefore, in subpart B, I argue that mul-
tiple corporate insiders could and generally do have ultimate
authority over the misstatements of their corporation.  Since Janus has
no bearing on how corporate officers who work together in the same
entity can be held jointly responsible on a theory of primary liabil-
ity[,] [i]t is not inconsistent with Janus Capital to presume that mul-
tiple people in a single corporation have the joint authority to
“make” an SEC filing, such that a misstatement has more than one
“maker.”111
Finally, in subpart C, I argue that this interpretation is not inconsis-
tent with Congress’s intent in passing the PSLRA.  Even though Con-
gress intended to prevent frivolous lawsuits under the federal
securities laws, ensuring corporate insiders do not escape liability alto-
gether is not at odds with that goal.
A. Application of Janus to Corporate Insiders
Since Janus, several courts have simply cited to Janus for the pro-
position that the group pleading doctrine is not viable in light of that
decision.  This oversimplifies the rule derived from Janus.  Not only
does the factual predicate for the Court’s decision differ from the
traditional group pleading doctrine application, but the policy con-
cerns expressed by the majority opinion are not relevant in those
traditional applications.
1. Factual Circumstances of Janus
Prior to Janus, lower courts predominantly applied the group
pleading doctrine in cases where plaintiffs were attempting to attri-
bute a corporation’s actions to its own insiders.112 Janus provides very
little guidance on these traditional cases because Janus involved en-
tirely different factual circumstances: a plaintiff attempting to attri-
110 But see Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2310
(2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that Justice Thomas’s holding applies to corporate
insiders).
111 City of Pontiac, 875 F. Supp. 2d at 374 (emphasis added).
112 See, e.g., In re Raytheon Sec. Litig., 157 F. Supp. 2d 131, 137 (D. Mass. 2001) (at-
tempting to attribute corporation’s actions to its CEO and CFO, among others); In re
SmarTalk Teleservices, Inc. Sec. Litig., 124 F. Supp. 2d 527, 545 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (at-
tempting to attribute corporation’s actions to its executive vice president, among others);
In re Livent, Inc. Sec. Litig., 78 F. Supp. 2d 194, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (attempting to attri-
bute corporation’s actions to its CEO and other executives).
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bute misstatements by one corporation to the corporate insiders of
another corporation.113
The plaintiffs in Janus would not have been able to rely on the
group pleading doctrine to assert JCF’s liability for misstatements in
JIF’s prospectuses.  After all, the majority explicitly found that the two
corporations were independent of one another.114  Because the group
pleading doctrine only creates a presumption of involvement, that
presumption would not be appropriate in a case where the corporate
agent is not an agent involved in the day-to-day activities of the com-
pany that released the misstatement.115  Rather, it is more sensible to
presume that a corporate insider is only involved in his own corpora-
tion’s activities.
2. Respecting Business Formalities
In addition to the factual differences mentioned above, investors
like the ones in Janus have the benefit of other legal protections avail-
able to them.  Unlike investors who traditionally rely on group plead-
ing, investors like the ones in Janus have the protection of the
“piercing the corporate veil” doctrine.116  However, Justice Thomas
held that JIF and JCM observed the corporate formalities and were
wholly independent, thereby foreclosing any veil-piercing argu-
ment.117  Justice Thomas stated,
Although First Derivative and its amici persuasively argue that invest-
ment advisers exercise significant influence over their client funds,
it is undisputed that the corporate formalities were observed
here. . . .  Any reapportionment of liability in the securities industry
113 See Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2299–301 (2011) (majority opinion); supra notes 69–76 and R
accompanying text.
114 Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2304.
115 See In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 60 F.3d 591, 593 (9th Cir. 1995); Blake v.
Dierdorff, 856 F.2d 1365, 1369 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that “presumption of collective
action when there is misleading ‘group published information’ is equally applicable to
members of a board of directors”); supra text accompanying notes 23–25. R
116 The concept of piercing the corporate veil “is among the most confusing in corpo-
rate law.”  Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52
U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 89 (1985).  Although states frame their veil-piercing doctrines in terms
of equitable relief, the simplest enunciation of veil piercing is that courts will forgo a cor-
poration’s limited liability where there is evidence that the corporation is merely an instru-
mentality for transacting another’s affairs. See, e.g., In re Payroll Express Corp., 216 B.R.
344, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d, 186 F.3d 196 (2d Cir. 1999) (applying New Jersey “alter
ego” doctrine); Vill. at Camelback Prop. Owners Ass’n v. Carr, 538 A.2d 528, 532–34 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1988) (“We have said that whenever one in control of a corporation uses that
control . . . to further his or her own personal interests, the fiction of the separate corpo-
rate identity may properly be disregarded.” (quoting Ashley v. Ashley, 393 A.2d 637, 641
(Pa. 1978))), aff’d, 572 A.2d 1 (Pa. 1990).
117 Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2304 (“JCM and Janus Investment Fund remain legally separate
entities, and Janus Investment Fund’s board of trustees was more independent than the
statute requires.”).
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in light of the close relationship between investment advisers and
mutual funds is properly the responsibility of Congress and not the
courts.118
Application of the group pleading doctrine in Janus would require a
court to disregard JCM’s independence from JIF, resulting in an unac-
ceptable inconsistency between veil-piercing and group pleading.
That is, it would be counterintuitive to say that JCM did not exhibit
sufficient control over JIF for the court to pierce the corporate veil119
but did exhibit sufficient control to presume that JCM made the mis-
statements for purposes of group pleading.120
The same concerns of contradiction do not arise when the group
pleading doctrine is used to hold corporate agents liable for state-
ments by their own corporation.  Courts use veil piercing to reach the
owners of the corporation, not its directors or executives.121  There-
fore, investors cannot rely on veil piercing to reach corporate agents
that are not controlling owners of the corporation for which they
work.  Instead, investors generally must rely on derivative suits, which
require particularity pleading under Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.122  These stringent pleading requirements were the
reason that group pleading was created in the first place.123
3. Reporting Obligations
Last, Justice Thomas relied on JIF’s statutory obligation to file a
prospectus to distinguish JIF’s liability from that of JCM.124  There is
no such distinction in the traditional application of the group plead-
ing doctrine because the corporate insiders work for the same com-
pany that files prospectuses with the SEC.  Further, it is those
corporate insiders who are ultimately responsible for the corpora-
118 Id. (citation omitted).
119 See generally Douglas G. Smith, Piercing the Corporate Veil in Regulated Industries, 2008
BYU L. REV. 1165, 1169–82 (2008) (detailing a number of factors that “courts generally
apply . . . none of which by itself is sufficient to establish liability”).
120 It would be odd to say that JCM was both in control and not in control of JIF at the
same time for two different purposes. See Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2301–05.
121 See generally Robert Charles Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors, 90
HARV. L. REV. 505, 541 (1977) (“subjecting to corporate liabilities the personal assets di-
rectly held by shareholders” when piercing the corporate veil); Mark J. Loewenstein, Veil
Piercing to Non-Owners: A Practical and Theoretical Inquiry, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 839,
839–40, 852–53 (2011) (noting that the entity owner is the party at risk for liability while
the officers are not).
122 See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).  Securities laws claims must meet particularity requirements
under the PSLRA as well. See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text. R
123 This statement is not intended to prove that group pleading is legally sound.
Rather, it is intended to show that group pleading serves an important purpose in its tradi-
tional application that is different and unique from its perceived purpose in a situation like
Janus.  The soundness of group pleading under the PSLRA is discussed infra Part III.C.
124 See Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2304.
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tion’s filings.125  In Janus, for example, there is no reason why plaintiff
investors would not be able to allege violations of Rule 10b-5 by JIF
even if the Court refused to find JCM’s management liable.126
B. Corporate Insiders and Ultimate Authority
Even if the traditional application of group pleading is inherently
different from the facts presented in Janus, the Court still provided a
concrete standard for Rule 10b-5 liability.  To be liable under Rule
10b-5, a corporate insider must have made the misstatement,127 and
the majority in Janus defined the maker of the misstatement as “the
person or entity with ultimate authority over the statement, including
its content and whether and how to communicate it.”128  This, too,
can complicate the application of the group pleading doctrine if Janus
were read to restrict liability to only one person.  After all, if only one
person may have ultimate authority over a misstatement, then a pre-
sumption that several corporate insiders made the misstatement
would be inapposite.  This subpart aims to show that nothing in the
Janus opinion suggests that only one person could have ultimate au-
thority over a misstatement.  Justice Thomas did not intend such a
narrow view, and the statutory language of Rule 10b-5 does not sup-
port this narrow view.  Further, the fundamental structure of business
organizations makes such a reading illogical.  Corporate decision
making is a complex process, and most statements are not attributable
to one person.
1. Justice Thomas’s Narrow Construction
The Janus dissent assumed, without justification, that the majority
intended only a single individual or entity to have ultimate authority
over a corporate statement.129  Although Justice Thomas used the sin-
125 See, e.g., Form 10-Q, General Instructions G (“At least one complete copy of the
report . . . must be manually signed on the registrant’s behalf by a duly authorized officer
of the registrant and by the principal financial or chief accounting officer of the regis-
trant.” (emphasis added)); Form 10-K, General Instructions D (requiring signatures of sev-
eral executives as well as “at least the majority of the board of directors”).  Specifically for
prospectuses, section 5 of the 1933 Act prohibits the sale of securities unless a statutory
prospectus is filed with the SEC. See 1933 Act, § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b) (2012).
126 In Janus, though, it would have made little sense to bring suit against JIF because
JIF was, in all likelihood, bankrupt. See Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2299 (“[JIF] has no assets apart
from those owned by the investors.”).
127 Recall that the first element of a Rule 10b-5 claim is a material misrepresentation
or omission by the defendant. See supra note 76. R
128 Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302.
129 See id. at 2307 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Nothing in the English language prevents
one from saying that several different individuals, separately or together, ‘make’ a state-
ment that each has a hand in producing.”).
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gular when articulating the Court’s rule,130 nowhere in the opinion
did he state that only one person or entity must be ultimately responsi-
ble for a statement.
Justice Thomas said that the “statements in the Janus Investment
Fund prospectuses were made by Janus Investment Fund, not by
JCM.”131  A principal tenet of corporate law, however, is that a corpo-
ration can only act through a human representative or agent.132  To
hold a corporation liable for a claim under Rule 10b-5 would be in
direct conflict with the statutory language, which contemplates only
natural persons being liable for untrue statements.133  Therefore, if
anyone would be liable for a violation of Rule 10b-5, it would be one
or more of the corporation’s agents.
The language of Rule 10b-5 sheds further light on the issue.
Rule 10b-5 states that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person . . . [t]o
make any untrue statement.”134  The use of the word “any,” rather
than “a” indicates that more than one person can be liable for an
untrue statement.  “Any” is defined as “one or some indiscriminately
of whatever kind.”135  Although sometimes only one person might be
responsible for untrue statements, the dictionary definition of “any”
indicates that more than one person may be responsible if they all
make the untrue statement.136  Many courts, including those that have
upheld and rejected the application of the group pleading doctrine,
have followed this reading of Rule 10b-5 post-Janus.137
130 See id. at 2302 (majority opinion) (“For purposes of Rule 10b-5, the maker of a
statement is the person or entity with ultimate authority over the statement, including its
content and whether and how to communicate it.”).
131 Id. at 2305.
132 See Suez Equity Investors, L.P. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 250 F.3d 87, 101 (2d Cir.
2001).
133 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013) (“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . .” (emphasis
added)).  Whether a corporation may be liable under Rule 10b-5 is an open question;
however, at least one court has held that a corporation may not be liable. See In re Merck &
Co., Inc. Sec., Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., Nos. 05-1151 (SRC), 05-2367(SRC), 2011 WL
3444199, at *25 (D.N.J. Aug. 8, 2011) (“Janus does not alter the well-established rule that ‘a
corporation can act only through its employees and agents.’” (quoting Suez Equity Inves-
tors, L.P. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 250 F.3d 87, 101 (2d. Cir. 2001))).
134 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (emphasis added).
135 Any Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
any (last visited Oct. 21, 2013).
136 See, e.g., Hammaker v. Brown & Brown, Inc., 214 F. Supp. 2d 575, 580 (E.D. Va.
2002) (“The term ‘any’ is defined as ‘one or more.’” (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L
DICTIONARY (1993))); Alcatel Space, S.A. v. Loral Space & Commc’ns Ltd., 154 F. Supp. 2d
570, 578 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 25 F. App’x 83 (2d Cir. 2002) (“‘[A]ny’ is defined as
‘[o]ne or some, regardless of sort, quantity or number.’” (citing WEBSTER’S II NEW RIVER-
SIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 76, 115 (1994))).
137 See, e.g., In re UBS AG Sec. Litig., No. 07 Civ. 11225(RJS), 2012 WL 4471265
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2012) (holding that “Janus might not necessarily imply that there can be
only one ‘maker’ of a statement in the case of express or implicit attribution” (quoting City
of Roseville Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. EnergySolutions, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 2d 395, 417 n.9 (S.D.N.Y.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-2\CRN205.txt unknown Seq: 22 10-JAN-14 12:01
478 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:457
2. Business Organizations and Corporate Decision Making
Because the majority opinion in Janus does not necessarily fore-
close the possibility of more than one responsible party, a look at the
structure of corporate decision making can help demonstrate that
holding multiple corporate insiders liable is more sensible than at-
tempting to attribute corporate statements to one particular
individual.
Each state, through its corporate law, allocates decision-making
responsibilities within an organization.138  Generally speaking, man-
agement of a business organization is vested in the board of direc-
tors,139 which then delegates and authorizes action to the
organization’s officers.140  Since the typical board of directors of a
large or medium-sized corporation consists of fifteen board mem-
bers,141 almost all high-level decisions will involve board members
sharing ultimate authority.
In addition, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires “[e]ach principal ex-
ecutive and principal financial officer of [an] issuer, or persons per-
forming similar functions . . . [to] sign a certification” when the
corporation releases disclosure reports.142  Any and all signatories to
the certification can be liable under Rule 10b-5 if there is a false state-
ment in the certified form.143  By its very terms, the Sarbanes-Oxley
2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); City of Roseville, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 417 (“There
is no dispute that [EnergySolutions, Inc.] and each of the Individual Defendants who
signed the Registration Statements ‘made’ the statements . . . .”).
138 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 300 (West 2012) (“The board may delegate the man-
agement of the day-to-day operation of the business of the corporation to a management
company or other person provided that the business and affairs of the corporation shall be
managed and all corporate powers shall be exercised under the ultimate direction of the
board.”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(a) (West 2012) (requiring a board of directors to
manage a corporation); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 701 (McKinney 2012) (“[T]he business of a
corporation shall be managed under the direction of its board of directors . . . .”); see also
Wayne O. Hanewicz, Director Primacy, Omnicare, and the Function of Corporate Law, 71 TENN.
L. REV. 511, 511 (2004) (“[C]orporate law does and should allocate decision-making au-
thority to various institutions, such as the board, the shareholders, and the judiciary,
and . . . this decision-making authority ought to be allocated so as to most efficiently ad-
vance the ultimate goal of corporate law.”).
139 See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (4th ed. 2007) (“All corporate powers
shall be exercised by or under the authority of the board of directors of the corporation,
and the business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed by or under the direc-
tion . . . of its board of directors . . . .”).
140 Id. § 8.41.  Beyond delegating power to management, at least one scholar has sug-
gested that a board of directors may continue to “serve as a source of advice and counsel to
the [CEO].” MYLES L. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY 13–17 (1971) (examining
director interviews in which directors claim they serve in an advisory role).
141 MACE, supra note 140, at 10. R
142 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-14 (2013).  The reports include Form 10-Q, Form 10-K, Form
20-F, and Form 40-F, with a few narrow exceptions. See id.
143 See Marc H. Folladori, A Practical Overview of the SEC’s Internal Controls and Executive
Disclosure Certification Rules, FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI L.L.P. LEGAL UPDATE 2–6 (July 26,
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Act implicates the possibility of multiple persons with ultimate author-
ity.  When both the CEO and CFO certify a statement, as required
under Sarbanes-Oxley, and a court determines that it was materially
untrue, both can be liable under Rule 10b-5.
The same can be said about joint press releases.  Of course, a
press statement by just the CEO warrants Rule 10b-5 liability solely for
that particular executive.  Rationally, the CEO in this scenario, as the
sole signatory of the press statement, was the party with ultimate au-
thority over its content.144  It logically follows that any press statement
made by several executive officers should be attributable to any and
all of them.  The same assumption inheres in this scenario: by becom-
ing signatories to the press release, each and every party had ultimate
authority over its contents.
Similarly, boards of directors have consistently been character-
ized as the “ultimate decisionmaking authority within the firm.”145
For example, the Delaware General Corporation Law’s default rule
places the responsibility of “business and affairs” in the hands of the
boards of directors.146  Corporate codes do not place decision-making
power in the hands of one person but in the entire board.147
An example of group decision making by a board of directors can
be found in committee decisions.  One of a board of directors’ re-
sponsibilities is to oversee compensation and governance of the cor-
poration.148  To do this more efficiently, boards delegate certain
responsibilities to smaller groups of board members called commit-
2005), available at http://www.martindale.com/banking-financial-services/article_Ful
bright-Jaworski-LLP_173006.htm.  Any persons who certify a periodic report also open
themselves up to criminal liability. See 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
144 See SEC v. Carter, No. 10 C 6145, 2011 WL 5980966, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 28, 2011).
145 Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA.
L. REV. 247, 291 (1999); see JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT,
PROMISES BROKEN 51 (2008) (“Perhaps the most basic principle of corporate law in the
United States is that corporations are controlled by boards of directors, rather than share-
holders.”); see also Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1291 (Del. 1998)
(“One of the most basic tenets of Delaware corporate law is that the board of directors has
the ultimate responsibility for managing the business and affairs of a corporation.”); John
C. Coates IV, Measuring the Domain of Mediating Hierarchy: How Contestable Are U.S. Public
Corporations?, 24 J. CORP. L. 837, 840 (1999) (“Absent tailored charter provisions, boards of
directors of both [public and private] corporations have ultimate legal authority to deter-
mine, say, whether to pursue mass layoffs to increase profits.”).
146 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (West 2012).
147 See supra note 138. R
148 See, e.g., Regina F. Burch, Director Oversight and Monitoring: The Standard of Care and
the Standard of Liability Post-Enron, 6 WYO. L. REV. 481, 517 (2006) (discussing two decisions
centering on the board of directors’ duty to oversee CEO compensation); Martin D.
Mobley, Compensation Committee Reports Post-Sarbanes-Oxley: Unimproved Disclosure of Executive
Compensation Policies and Practices, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 111, 117 (noting that the
board of directors is one of the primary participants in corporate governance).
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tees.149  At a minimum, public corporations have at least three differ-
ent committees: audit,150 compensation,151 and nominating.152  Each
of these committees is responsible for a function related to corporate
governance and to ensure that the public receives proper disclosure.
When a committee fails to serve its purpose, the members of that com-
mittee can be liable for damages that other directors would not be
liable for.153  In In re Lernout & Hauspie Securities Litigation,154 the
court found sufficient evidence to hold the members of the audit
committee liable for misstatements on a Form 10-K based on the fact
that they all signed the Form S-3, which incorporated the fraudulent
statements.155  Just as a CEO and CFO can both be liable for their
corporation’s untrue statements, multiple committee members can
also be liable for statements made by their respective committees.
C. PSLRA and Corporate Insiders
Even if Janus’s “ultimate authority” requirement does not pre-
clude the application of the group pleading doctrine to multiple cor-
porate insiders, the PSLRA still stands as a gatekeeper to the federal
courts.156  But as is evident from the legislative history, Congress
passed the PSLRA to prevent frivolous lawsuits, not to shield all corpo-
rate insiders.  Using group pleading to ensure that corporate insiders
are liable for unattributed group statements is consistent with the
goals of the PSLRA.
The fundamental purpose of group pleading is to presume that
corporate insiders are responsible for their corporation’s misstate-
ments only when those corporate insiders are sufficiently involved in
149 See Scott V. Simpson, The Emerging Role of the Special Committee—Ensuring Business
Judgment Rule Protection in the Context of Management Leveraged Buyouts and Other Corporate
Transactions Involving Conflicts of Interest, 43 BUS. LAW. 665, 665 (1988).
150 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m) (2012)).
151 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-3 (2012); see also Regulation S-K (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 229.402
(2013)) (outlining the duties of the compensation committee).  Although compensation
reports do not create liability under section 11 of the 1933 Act because they do not need to
be filed, an action under Rule 10b-5 is broader than section 11 liability and does not have a
filing requirement to create liability.
152 Although corporations are not required to have nominating committees,
ninety-nine percent of Standards and Poor companies have them. See Michael K. Molitor,
The Crucial Role of the Nominating Committee: Re-Inventing Nominating Committees in the After-
math of Shareholder Access to the Proxy, 11 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 97, 108 (2010).  For a discus-
sion on the rise of nominating committees, see generally id.
153 See, e.g., In re JWP Inc. Sec. Litig., 928 F. Supp. 1239, 1257 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (discuss-
ing the liability of members of an auditing committee); Greenfield v. Prof’l Care, Inc., 677
F. Supp. 110, 114–15 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
154 286 B.R. 33 (D. Mass. 2002).
155 Id. at 37.
156 See Strum v. Marriot Marquis Corp., 85 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1366 (2000) (“The Re-
form Act contemplates that the district courts will serve a gatekeeping role . . . .”).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-2\CRN205.txt unknown Seq: 25 10-JAN-14 12:01
2014] THE NEW GROUP PLEADING DOCTRINE 481
their corporation’s decision-making process.157  Plaintiffs that rely on
group pleading may not entirely forgo their obligation to plead facts
that plausibly allege an untrue statement; rather, the traditional appli-
cation of group pleading still requires that plaintiffs plead the misrepre-
sentations with particularity.158  Critics of group pleading contend that
the PSLRA requires particularized factual allegations with respect to
each specific defendant.159  And as discussed above, several circuits
have interpreted the PSLRA to require this particularized pleading
with respect to each defendant’s act.160
Pleading any allegation made on information and belief is not a
barrier to the application of the group pleading doctrine because
nothing in the statute requires particularized pleading as to each indi-
vidual defendant.  The PSLRA only requires particularized pleading
for “an allegation regarding the statement or omission,” not the defend-
ants’ identities.161  Indeed, it is sufficient for a plaintiff to allege with
particularity that specific statements by unknown defendants within a
corporation are untrue.  This makes sense considering what we know
about business organizations and their decision making: multiple cor-
porate insiders tend to be responsible for any given corporate deci-
sion.162  Thus, once a plaintiff pleads particularized facts regarding an
untrue statement, a court may permissibly presume that several corpo-
rate insider defendants were responsible for that untrue statement.163
This interpretation is also consistent with the purpose of the
PSLRA: to end frivolous lawsuits.164  Supporters like Richard Breeden,
157 See supra notes 22–25 and accompanying text. R
158 See Wool v. Tandem Computers Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1440 (9th Cir. 1987).
159 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)(A) to (B) (2012) (stating that plaintiffs must allege “the
defendant made an untrue statement of material fact . . . and, if an allegation regarding
the statement or omission is made on information and belief, the complaint shall state with
particularity all facts on which that belief is formed.” (emphasis added)).  The PSLRA also
requires a plaintiff to plead each defendant’s scienter with particularity.  This requirement
does not present problems with group pleading because group pleading presumes action
by corporate insiders, not state of mind.  There is another doctrine termed “collective sci-
enter” that has a similar application to group pleading; however, this falls outside the scope
of this Note.  For background on collective scienter in SEC enforcement actions, see gener-
ally Bradley J. Bondi, Dangerous Liasons: Collective Scienter in SEC Enforcement Actions, 6 N.Y.U.
J.L. & BUS. 1 (2009) (recounting the history of collective scienter and the various views by
the circuits).
160 See supra text accompanying notes 46–55. R
161 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
162 See supra notes 138–55 and accompanying text. R
163 See, e.g., Haw. Ironworkers Annuity Trust Fund v. Cole, No. 3:10CV371, 2011 WL
3862206, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 1, 2011) (upholding plaintiffs’ complaint that four com-
pany officers worked together to falsify financial statements).
164 William J. Clinton, Veto Message for Securities Litigation Reform Act (Dec. 20,
1995), 1995 WL 752715, at *1 (“This legislation is designed to reform portions of the Fed-
eral securities laws to end frivolous lawsuits and to ensure that investors receive the best
possible information by reducing the litigation risk to companies that make forward-look-
ing statements.”).  In addition, Congress intended the PSLRA to curb the number of
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former chairman of the SEC, praised the PSLRA prior to its passage.
Still, he cautioned, “[t]he challenge, then, is to devise ways to reduce
unwarranted securities litigation without closing the courthouse door
for victims of intentional securities fraud.”165  Once a plaintiff alleges
that an untrue statement was made with the requisite particularity,
courts should no longer be concerned with preventing frivolous law-
suits, primarily because the plaintiff’s allegations are sufficiently par-
ticular to assuage fears of frivolity.  Instead, courts should be
concerned with ensuring that their courthouse doors are not closed to
plaintiffs.  The inability of a plaintiff to allege precisely who made the
untrue statement should not act as a bar.
CONCLUSION
The group pleading doctrine does not attempt to create addi-
tional liability for innocent defendants.  The doctrine is simply a pre-
sumption that certain corporate insiders involved with the day-to-day
business of the corporation are responsible for statements made on
behalf of the corporation.166  The presumption only extends to “indi-
viduals with ‘direct involvement in the everyday business of the
company.’”167
Although the group pleading doctrine should be narrowly ap-
plied after Janus, the complete rejection of group pleading is inappro-
priate. Janus makes it clear that a third party cannot have ultimate
authority over the statements of an independent corporation.168  This
so-called strike suits that were being brought.  141 CONG. REC. E555-03 (daily ed. Mar. 8,
1995), 1995 WL 94323, at *1 (statement of Rep. Lofgren) (“Over the past year of study, I
have reached the conclusion that, especially for high technology companies, there is a
problem of strike lawsuits that requires remedy.”).  Strike suits are lawsuits that are brought
with the sole intention of getting to discovery and seeking settlement with the corporation.
See S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 6 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 685, 1995 WL 372783
(“Indeed, a 1994 Securities Subcommittee Staff Report found ‘evidence . . . that plaintiffs’
counsel in many instances litigate with a view toward ensuring payment for their services
without sufficient regard to whether their clients are receiving adequate compensation in
light of evidence of wrongdoing.’”).
165 Securities Litigation Revisions: Hearing on S. 240 Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the S.
Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 104th Cong. (1995) (testimony of Richard C.
Breeden) (internal quotation marks omitted).
166 See In re Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litig., 1 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1108 (D. Nev. 1998)
(“Under this doctrine, plaintiffs may rely on a presumption that statements in ‘prospec-
tuses, registration statements, annual reports, press releases, or other “group-published in-
formation,”’ are the collective work of those individuals with direct involvement in the
everyday business of the company.” (quoting In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F.
Supp. 746, 759 (N.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d, 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999))).
167 SEC v. Landberg, 836 F. Supp. 2d 148, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting In re Refco,
Inc. Sec. Litig., 503 F. Supp. 2d 611, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)).
168 See Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2306 (2011)
(holding that while Janus Management and Janus Fund are “closely related[,] . . . only the
Janus Fund, not Janus Management, could have ‘ma[d]e’ those statements,” since only
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is reasonable in light of previous case law and the PSLRA. Janus, how-
ever, does not foreclose the application of the group pleading doc-
trine to corporate insiders.  Not only are the facts of Janus different
from the traditional application of the group pleading doctrine, but
the basic corporate model indicates that several individuals within an
organization regularly have ultimate authority over the same
statements.
Lastly, nothing in the PSLRA prevents plaintiffs from bringing an
action against several corporate insiders, so long as they are able to
allege the untrue statements on information and belief with particu-
larity.  The particularity requirement does not extend to individual
defendants, and such a reading would be contrary to a plain reading
of the statute and its purpose.
“the Janus Fund’s board of trustees has ‘ultimate authority’ over the content of the state-
ments in a Fund prospectus”).
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